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THE TRANSFORMATION OF 

AMERICAN SENTIMENT 

TOWARDS GERMANY. 

1870-1914 



BY 

CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 



A Summary of a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Clark 

University, Worcester, Mass., in Partial Fulfillment of the 

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

and Accepted on the Recommendation of 

George H. Blakeslee 



Reprinted from The Journal of International Relations 
Vol. 12, No. 1, .July, 1921 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF 

AMERICAN SENTIMENT 

TOWARDS GERMANY. 

1870-1914 



BT 

CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 



A Summary of a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Clark 

University, Worcester, Mass., in Partial Fulfillment of the 

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

and Accepted on the Recommendation of 

George H. Blakeslee 



Reprinted from The Journal of International Relations 
Vol. 12, No. 1, July, 1921 



Reprinted from Journal op International Relations 
Vol. 12, No. 1, July, 1921 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SENTI- 
MENT TOWARDS GERMANY, 1870-19141 

By Clara Eve Schieber, Ph.D., Professor of History, King- 
fisher College, Kingfisher, Oklahoma 

I. Introductory 

This article will attempt to give a concise account of the 
changes in the attitude of the United States towards Ger- 
many from 1870 to the outbreak of the world war. In 1870 
the sympathies of the United States were unquestionably 
with Germany. During the half century which followed our 
sentiment had gradually changed, so that in 1914 the pre- 
vailing attitude in this country was anti-German. The 
alteration of our attitude came about as the result of a series 
of diplomatic and commercial incidents and certain definite 
tendencies in Germanic policy, culture and society which 
aroused the fears and suspicions of Americans. It will be 
the purpose of this article to describe briefly the nature of 
the changes in the American feeling towards Germany, to- 
gether with the causes for these transformations. 

II. American Opinion with Respect to the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870-1871 

1 . The background of American sympathy for Gerinany in 1 870 

Much has been made in the last seven years of the "wrong 
done to France" by Germany in 1870, which President 
Wilson held must be righted as one of the results of the world 
war. On the contrary the American attitude in 1870 was 
that no wrong had been done to France by either the war or 
the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Rather, the American public 

^ This article is a condensation of a more elaborate study of the same 
title submitted as a Ph.D. dissertation at Clark University, 1920. 

50 
.-. : Gift 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 51 

agreed with a recent expression of opinion by Clemenceau 
that the wrongs done in 1870 were those committed by the 
French." It is interesting to consider why we should have 
entertained this attitude a half century ago. 

The Germans in the United States in the thirties and for- 
ties had tended to be radicals and supporters of liberal 
policies in this country. The German element in the Free 
Soil Party was a large one. The United States sympathized 
with the aspirations of the German liberals in 1848, and this 
attitude was notably forwarded by the exiles from that group 
who took refuge here after the collapse of the liberal move- 
ment. Germany, along with Russia, had been the chief 
European sympathizer with the North in the Civil War The 
conspicuous fairness of the Prince Consort of England in 
the early part of the Civil War called attention to his German 
extraction. German universities were the center of the 
world's intellectual life at that time, and Americans recog- 
nized the German hegemony in scholarship and were be- 
ginning that notable academic hegira to Germany which 
lasted for a generation. Finally, the German aspiration for 
national unity naturally appealed to a nation which had 
just passed through a great conflict to achieve a similar aim. 

On the other hand there were equally obvious reasons why 
the United States was suspicious and fearful of France in 
1870. The dupHcity and oppression of the first Napoleon 
between 1800 and 1815 had not been forgotton, and the 
ruler of France in 1870 was a Bonaparte. The policy of 
Napoleon III had been one of autocracy, mihtarism and im- 
perialism. It had come home to us in the invasion of Mexico 
in 1861 and the years immediately following. There was a 
very general feeling that the Franco-Prussian War was a 
product of his aggressive and domineering action and that 
his dynasty and supporters were in great need of such salu- 
tary disciphne as would be furnished by a stinging defeat 
at the hands of Prussia. We now know that they were 
wrong in attributing the French responsibility for the war to 
Napoleon rather than to Gramont and Eugenie.^ 

2 Saturday Evening Post, March 12, 1921. 

3 Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, vols, vi-vii; Sorel, Histoire diplo- 
matique de la guerre jranco-allemandc. 



52 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER 

2. American sympathy with Germany in 1870-71 

George Bancroft, our minister to Germany in 1870, well 
expressed the current pro-German opinion in a letter written 
to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish : 

Our foreign political interests almost always run parallel with 
those of Germany, and are often in direct conflict with those of 
France. Bismarck and the King were true to our union during 
our Civil War — when France took sides against us, Germany 
respected the independence of Mexico; the French supported the 

Austrian adventurer Bismarck loves to give the 

United States prominence in the eyes of Europe as a balance to 
Great Britian. If we need the solid, trusty good will of any 
government in Europe, we can have it best with Germany; because 
German institutions and ours most nearly resemble each other, 
and because so many millions of Germans have become our 
countrymen. This war will leave Germany the most powerful 
state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship, is, therefore, 
most important to us ; and has its foundations in history and in 
nature. The more I learn of the present condition of France, 
the more deeply does the country seem to have been injured by 
the corrupting, wasteful and immoral government of Louis 
Napoleon.^ 

Our minister to France, Elihu B. Washburne, lays the 
blame for the Franco-Prussian war squarely upon France 
and claims that it was brought about to strengthen the 
dynastic future of the Bonaparte line." Charles Sumner, 
chairman of the conamittee on foreign relations of the senate 
of the United States, made a vigorous speech on "The 
Duel between France and Germany," in which he vigorously 
condemned the former: 

Considering the age, and the present demands of civiHzation 
such a war stands forth terrific in wrong, making the soul rise 

indignant against it It is a war of pretexts, the real 

object being the humihation and dismemberment of Germany, 
in the vain hope of exalting the French Empire and perpetrating 
a bauble crown on the head of a boy. By a military success and 
a peace dictated at BerHn, the Emperor trusted to find himseK 
in such condition, that, on return to Paris, he could overthrow 
parhamentary government so far as it existed there, and reestab- 
lish personal government, where all depended on himseK — thus 
making triumph over Germany the means of another triumph 
over the French people.® 

* Howe, lAje and Letters of George Bancroft, pp. 246-7. 
^ Washburne, Elihu B. Recollections, p. 33. 

* The Duel between France and Germaiiy, pp. 266-7. 



AMEKICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 53 

The newspapers of the country were overwhelmingly in 
favor of Germany. Only the JSew York World and the Boston 
Post were consistently pro-French. Perhaps the most 
notably pro-German periodical in the country was Har- 
per's Weekly. The New York Times stated that 

The attempt of France to entice Prussia into war is a crime 
which has no counterpart since the partition of Poland. France 
seems doomed to defeat and she will have to thank the Emperor 
for the humiliation.'' 

The Boston Herald held that 

Napoleon was chagrined by the advance of Prussia to the head 
of European powers. He knew his dynasty was weak and hoped 
by a victory over Prussia to place himself more firmly in his seat. 
He seized the first pretext — a. flimsy affair — and went in.^ 

The New York Tribune contended that 

Napoleon threatens hostilities on perfectly insuflacient grounds 
. . . Neither abstract justice, nor present expediency, nor 
the historic policy of his own realm, justifies him in the course he 
now pursues.^ 

The Springfield Republican raised the query 

What is the war all about? The sad answer must be the old 
one: the ambitions of kings, the lust of conquest and the folly 

of the people The moral enormity of precipitating 

war at the present time is unspeakable, and the guilt of it will 
rest wholly with Louis Napoleon.^" 

The Chicago Daily Tribune maintained that 

France wars at a mere pretence Napoleon wanted 

war. The united sense of mankind is. that the ruler who precipi- 
tates war without a cause is the greatest of criminals and wholly 
unfit to preside over the destinies of any nation.^^ 

The Independent was particularly bitter in its indictment 
of Louis Napoleon: 

If there is one man in Europe who has outlived his day, who 
belongs not to the present but to the past, who is a charlatan 

■> July 28, 1870. 

« November 3, 1870. 

9 July 12, 1870. 
10 July 12, 1870. 
" July 20, 1870. 



54 CLAEA EVE SCHIEBER 

instead of a statesman, a usurper instead of a rightful prince, 
that man is Louis Napoleon. Every drop of blood now flowing 
in Europe adds a new stain to his name. He is responsible, and 
he alone, for this upheaval of the volcano of war. It was he, and 
he only, who made a causeless attack upon a great nation that 
would not draw a sword except in self-defence. God pity the 
French people, but overthrow the French Emperor.^^ 

When will Heaven rid the earth of the last vestige of the Bona- 
partes? If France suffers him, or any of his name, to remain on 
her soil after this last crowning crime, she will deserve no pity 
for all she has suffered or all that she may yet suffer at his hands. 
She will show herself fit only to be the slave of such a master.^^ 

The New York World, on the contrary, insisted that 

The government of Prussia has become the most autocratic 

in Europe The objection of the French Emperor 

to a Prussian prince on the throne of Spain is perfectly valid. 
. . France would need a large standing army if a Hohenzollern 
were on the throne of Spain. France would be between two 
Hohenzollerns.^* 

Likewise the Boston Post charged that 

The war is of Bismarck's making. . . . It is a war between 
Liberalism and despotism. , . Napoleon has kept France in 
the path of progress Prussia is a military govern- 
ment in the strictest sense. The king lays his iron hand on his 
people in their very cradles, and keeps it there with a tight grip 
till they go to their graves. . . The Prussian soldier fights 
for his king, not for his country.^^ 

The newspapers of the country were exultant over the 
crushing defeat of the French. They hailed it as a salu- 
tary lesson to any state which would ruthlessly and need- 
lessly break the peace of Europe. They criticized the 
aggressiveness and militarism that lay beneath it all. Yet 
sympathy was expressed for the French people, while Ger- 
man unity and the promise of French republicanism were 
extolled. There was practically no criticism of the indem- 
nity of five billion francs and but little critical comment on 
the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Most papers regarded them 
as the legitimate spoils of war and some influential papers 

12 August 18, 1870. 
" September 8, 1870. 
" July 16, 20, 1870. 
15 July 13, 18, 1870. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 55 

claimed that they really belonged to Germany, from whom 
France wrested them by force. The Springfield Republican 
said that 

The provinces that France made the stepping stones to her 
assaults on Germany were once German and are in every sense 
stolen property. They ought to go for something in the settlement 

of the account The present sufferings of France are 

her best hopes for the future. She needs to feel through her 
humiliation her wrong-doing.^^ 

The Philadelphia Inquirer remarked that 

France must be prepared to suffer the loss of Alsace and Lor- 
raine. They seem naturally to belong to Germany rather than 
to France. They were formerly a part of Germany and speak 
a German dialect.^^ 

The majority of the press, thus, agreed with the majority 
of the statesmen in expressing their sympathy for Germany 
in the Franco-Prussian War because (1) German-Americans 
had rendered splendid service in the Union army during the 
Civil War; while France had aided the Confederacy and 
attempted intervention in Mexico; (2) Germany was be- 
lieved to have fought a defensive war, while France was the 
aggressor and brought Europe into a great war for a mere 
dynastic ambition and on a flimsy pretext; (3) the war was 
for German unity against French imperialism and militarism; 
(4) Germany had succeeded in overthrowing the feared and 
distrusted Napoleonic despotism and aided the French re- 
publicans. It will be the task of the remainder of this 
article to show how this evident cordial friendliness to 
Germany in 1870-71 turned to suspicion and fear, if not 
positive dishke. 

" October 24, 1870. 
" September 23, 1871. 



56 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 

III. The Progress of Anti-German Sentiment in the 
United States Since 1871 

1. The historical background of German-American Relor- 
lions, 1870-1914- 

In produciDg the growing ill-feeling between Germany and 
the United States since 1870 several factors stand out most 
prominently. First, Germany went rapidly through a 
great industrial revolution which created a need for more 
markets and helped to stimulate the movement towards 
colonization and Weltpolitik. Then Bismarck succeeded in 
Prussianizing the empire and welding it into an autocratic 
and militaristic unity. These developments might not have 
been as noticeable or as potent in leading to foreign suspi- 
cion had the policy remained under the control of Bismarck 
until 1914. It was Germany's misfortune to be ruled after 
1888 by an emperor who took things into his own hands and 
became the publicity agent of the new Germanic tendencies. 
By his ill-considered and hasty utterances he served to make 
Germany's aggressiveness seem worse than it really was 
and to arouse suspicions that otherwise would have remained 
dormant. In short, the kaiser, the industrial revolution, 
and the resulting nationalism and imperiahsm served to 
create the pattern of German behavior and international 
reputation which lost for her the good-will of the United 
States. Finally, it must not be forgotten that after 1890 
we also entered fairly enthusiastically into the fasionable 
expansionist policy and naturally came into conflict with 
German counter ambitions. ^^ 

2. The Samoan controversy 

There is no more telUng indictment of war than the proof 
that a great conflict may be generated by a most petty dis- 
pute. It is little known that a war was imminent between 

18 W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany; and The German 
Empire, vol. ii; A. Zimmermann, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik; 
C. Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances; W. Weyl, 
American World Policies. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 57 

Great Britain, Germany and the United States in 1889 over 
the insignificant Samoan islands and was averted only 
through a storm which destroyed the rival warships. 

In 1872 the Samoan islanders petitioned the United States 
for annexation. This was rejected, but by a treaty of 1878 
the United States, in return for a Samoan port, a coaling 
station, and a naval base, agreed to mediate between the 
Samoans and other countries. Germany and Great Britain 
soon obtained similar concessions and these led to conflicting 
claims and pretensions, which were intensified by the acts 
and statements of indiscreet and often unwise consuls. 
A conference held in June- July, 1887, failed because Ger- 
many insisted on ascendency in the Samoan islands. She 
then proceeded to violate existing agreements and to advance 
her interests by force. War seemed imminent. Secretary 
of State Bayard informed our minister at Berlin that 
^'the course taken by Germany in respect to Samoa cannot 
be regarded as having been marked by that just considera- 
tion which the ancient friendship between the United 
States and Germany entitled this government to expect, "i® 
The Pacific Coast papers vigorously attacked the German 
action in Samoa, declaring that Germany was a plain 
highwayman and that her treatment of the natives was 
atrocious.2o When it seemed as though hostilities could 
not be averted a tjrphoon destroyed the warships of the 
contending powers in the Samoan islands on March 16-17, 
1889. Bismarck took advantage of the enforced lull in 
active operations in this region to call a conference of the 
powers concerned, which met in Berlin in April, 1889. A 
treaty which satisfied the United States was signed on 
June 14, 1889. During the next decade there was much 
friction and Germany was accused of failing to abide by her 
agreements, but the matter was finally adjusted by the treaty 
of December 2, 1899. 

The American press was nearly unanimous in condemning 
the attitude and activities of Germany in the Samoan 

" Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, Part I, p. 607. 
2" San Francisco Chronicle, November 26, 1888; San Francisco Examiner, 
November 27. 1888. 



58 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 

islands, though some Republican papers attempted to 
make political capital out of the situation by attributing 
the trouble to Democratic bungling in diplomacy. The 
opinion of the Boston Transcript is typical of this criticism 
and distrust of Germany: 

It will be difficult for Germany to disprove the suspicion that 
all this trouble in Samoa has been worked in Samoa on plans 
mapped out in Berlin. Unless the consul has gone mad, it is 
impossible to believe that his high-handed proceedings were 
undertaken without some foreknowledge or secret approval by 
his government.21 

The New York Evening Post, with its strong anti-imperial- 
istic trend, criticised the United States for interfering in 
Samoa and recommended American withdrawal from all 
parts of Samoa except the port of Pago Pago: 

The Americans have one more evidence of what "empire 
building" means. It means shelling defenceless native villages, 
making our flag the symbol of high-handed interference, and 
converting us into the oppressor of all nations, instead of the 
refuge of the oppressed. ^^ 

While the Samoan crisis passed without any serious 
results, it is significant as marking the first definite friction 
with Germany and the earliest appearance of any gen- 
eral American sentiment of distrust and suspicion against 
Germany. 

3. The German participation in the partition of China 

In November, 1897, the exasperated Chinese killed two 
German Catholic missionaries in the Shantung peninsula. 
Though the kaiser was not noted for his love of the German 
Catholics at home, he quickly beheld in these two slain 
missionaries his "dear brothers in Christ" and made use of 
this incident to obtain one of the most enviable of the 
modem concessions in China. Without waiting for China 
to be persuaded to make this grant, the Germans forced her 
to concede a ninety-nine year lease of the port of Kiao-Chau 
and the economic exploitation of the rich and populous 

" April 20, 1889. 
" April 6, 1889. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 59 

Shantung peninsula. The Chinese were extremely bitter 
over the extortion but could do nothing until the Boxer 
Uprising in 1900, when they murdered the German minister 
at Pekin. Germany retaliated in a savage manner. In 
despatching troops to the Orient the kaiser made his famous 
speech directing them to emulate the Huns and "give no 
quarter, spare nobody, make no prisoners. Use your wea- 
pons so that for a thousand years hence no Chinaman will 
dare to look askance at any German. Open the way for 
civilization once for all." The German aggressiveness 
in leading the allied forces of reprisal and their large 
indemnity further served to bring them into disrepute with 
the more moderately minded Americans. 

The American press was suspicious of the German inter- 
vention in Shantung and clearly recognized the impulse 
of Weltpolitik in the Kaiser's solicitude for his slain Cathohc 
brethren. 23 We had ourselves now begun an active expan- 
sionist policy and had acquired interests in the Orient — the 
Philippine Islands. Our press was beginning to take the cue 
from the commercial and expansionist interests. The Cleve- 
land Plain Dealer warned us that 

It is of considerable matter to the United States what becomes 
of China and how the old empire is parcelled out, because 
the present volume of the trade of the United States with China 
represents more than one-seventh of the trade of the empire. ^^ 

The Chicago Tribune expresses an opinion which was 
typical of the tenor of the American press : 

German}' was simply awaiting a pretext to occupy a portion 
of territory belonging to the Celestial Empire. Germany has 
always been anxious to obtain territory in the Far East. Her 
citizens were especially anxious that the black, white and red 
flag should wave over a section of China, and their Government 
seeing an opportunity growing out of the murder of the two 

missionaries promptly seized it It will require a 

more adroit player than the German kaiser to "conceal his 
hand. "25 

The deep personal interest the Kaiser professes in the fate of 
the missionaries whose murder furnishes the occasion for the 

" See notes 25 and 26 below. 

" May 24, 1898. 

" November 26. 1897. 



60 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER 

display of arbitrary power against a foreign nation will be widely 
regarded as a transparent "fake."^^ 

The fiery utterances of the kaiser called down upon him 
the condemnation of the American press for his anachronistic 
brutahty of expression. The Boston Transcript declared that 

The contrast between the utterances of the German Emperor, 
breathing forth threatening and slaughter, and the calm, courteous, 
moderate temper shown by the Administration at Washington 
is strongly marked. While the United States is exerting every 
effort to prevent war, Emperor William is using his opportunities 
to foment a war spirit. The fact is not to be blinked at that Ger- 
many is bent upon waging a war of reprisal in China. . . . Her 
undisguised purpose in sending troops to China is to wreak 
vengeance upon the Chinese.^^ 

The high indemnity stirred both press and publicists. 
Our minister to China, Mr. Rockhill, condemned Germany 
in the following manner: 

Germany is insisting on her pound of flesh. She has announced 
her purpose to require the payment of every ounce she has deman- 
ded If Germany stands by her declaration to retain 

her troops in China until the indemnity is paid, the authorities 
say that this will mean that she will remain permanently .^^ 

The Americans were thus unmistakably opposed to the 
manner in which Germany Srst entered China and the con- 
tinuation of her initial aggressive pohcy toward the 
Chinese was a source of a growing suspicion of German 
methods wherever exercised. Americans were willing to 
allow for the serious offence against international law and 
comity in the murder of the German minister, Baron Von 
Ketteler, at the hands of the Chinese. But the demands of 
the kaiser were in excess of any reason in the matter. There 
were many columns in the daily press and long articles in 
magazines besides the utterances of public men that show 
that Americans looked with the greatest disfavor and dis- 
trust upon the policy that the German emperor was following 
in China. His instructions to his soldiers departing for the 
East were especially out of harmony with the ideals of 

" Ibid., December 3, 1897. 

" July 28, 1900. 

" New York Herald, April 12. 1901. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 61 

Americans and the practices of modern warfare. These 
very words excited a bitter feeling in the United States 
and did much to keep Americans on the alert as to what was 
actually being done in China. The fact that the American 
press applied the name "Hun" to the Germans at this time 
is especially significant. Public sentiment in this country 
was unanimous and loud in its protest against Germany 
throughout the entire Chinese trouble. The taking of 
Kiao-Chau is always spoken of as "piratical;" the mili- 
tary methods of the German troops as far more severe than 
the situation demanded; and the indemnity greatly in ex- 
cess of actual loss — in fact, from the very beginning Ameri- 
cans were united in condemning the Germans in China. 

4. Admiral Dewey and the Germans in the Philippines 

We now have first-hand evidence as to the causes of 
German activity in the Philippines in the spring of 1898. 
German officials have admitted that Germany was at this 
time hopeful of building up a great Pacific empire and seemed 
to have excellent prospects of realizing this aspiration until 
the United States and Japan appeared in the field as con- 
tenders. Germany was determined to be on the alert to 
obtain control of the Philippines if it was possible to do so 
without getting into war with the United States. She was 
also possibly encouraged by a casual remark of Ambassador 
White that the United States did not desire the Philippines. 

A feeling of suspicion towards German aggression in 
the Shantung peninsula in 1897 had been generated in the 
American mind and had been shared by naval authorities 
and officers. In addition to the general setting of distrust 
there was a special cause of ill-feeling. At a banquet 
given by Prince Henry of Prussia in March, 1898, to officers 
of the foreign war vessels at Hong Kong, Dewey felt that 
the American officers had been slighted. After Dewey 
had begun his operation in the PhiUppines, and contrary to 
his express warning, the German admiral, Von Diederichs, 
ignored the American blockade and proceeded to carry on 
intercourse with the Spaniards, and even to provision them. 



62 CLAEA EVE SCHIEBER 

Dewey promptly ordered the Germans to obey inter- 
national law and an open clash might have come had not 
the British commander in these waters, Captain Chichester, 
informed Diederichs that he regarded Dewey as wholly in 
the right. Another irritating incident in the Philippines 
was that at Subig Bay, where the German cruiser Irene was 
surprised in the act of aiding Spain. The Germans denied 
but did not disprove guilt. 

The attitude towards the United States in the German 
press was extremely critical, though probably not as 
scurillous as that of the French and Italian papers. In 
fact, it is known that France, Germany and Austria tried 
to organize a European coalition to prevent the United 
States from intervening in Cuba. Of course, it must be 
remembered that the Catholic countries were fully aware 
of the pope's intervention in behalf of peace and of the 
American duplicity in keeping secret the Spanish assent to 
our ultimatum." But however righteous may have been 
the German criticism of our entry into the war with Spain, 
it is true that the German press bitterly criticised the course 
of this country and this helped to increase the ill-feeling 
produced between the two countries by events in the Orient. 

The following excerpts well illustrate the attitude of the 
American press with respect to German activities in the 
Philippines. The Chicago Tribune contended that 

There is a strong suspicion that the kaiser has been casting a 
covetous eye towards the Philippines and would be glad for any 
pretext that would furnish him with an excuse for getting a finger 

in our quarrel with Spain But if the kaiser is really 

seeking a pretext to make another land-grab as he did at Kiao- 
Chau a few months ago, he will find quite another element to 
deal with than he did in that case.^° 

The INew York Times expressed a doubt that the German 
naval force in the Philippines was there solely to protect 
German subjects and interests in that region: 

The apparatus she has provided is quite out of proportion to 
the object to be attained. There may be forty or fifty German 

2^ Nation, Vol. Ixxiii, p. 4. 
30 June 15, 1898. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 63 

subjects doing business in Manila. ... A single man-of-war 
could accommodate the entire German population of Manila. Yet 
the provision that Germany has made is a squadron composed, 
at last accounts, of five vessels, and superior to the American 
squadron which destroyed the Spanish fleet and which now holds 

Manila under its guns We should be very simple 

to believe that this force has been assembled merely to rescue 

German inhabitants from the fury of Auguinaldo 

There can be no doubt of the unofficial American view of the 
assemblage of a German squadron in Manila Bay. It is that 
that assemblage is unmannerly and provocative, and that it is 
meant not to protect existing German interests but to find new 
interests to protect. ^^ 

The Springfield Republican thought that 

The presence of five German warships at Manila, with two 
more near at hand, seems so utterly disproportionate to the 
German interests requiring protection at that port as to arouse 
suspicion in the minds of the American people concerning Ger- 
many's intention in the Philippines. It is nonsense to suppose 
that seven or five warships are necessary to protect the lives and 
the property of the few German residents in Manila. . . , . 
The size of the Kaiser's fleet at Manila can be safely attributed 
to that monarch's irrepressible desire to cut a large figure in the 

world He is always eager to impress foreign parts 

with the glory and power of the Hohenzollerns.'^ 

The Boston Herald held that the trouble came from the 
kaiser's vanity and ambition: 

After all, WiUiam of Germany may mean no harm by his 
irritating meddlesomeness in and about the Phihppines. Perhaps 
he does not really know that it is irritating. He is probably 
troubled by the thought that he may be forgotten if he does not 
thrust himself into prominence and keep there; that something 
of great political moment may be carried to a successful end 
without taking him into consideration as an indispensable factor; 
and he yearns to be in evidence, even if he should accomphsh 
nothing more than adding to the amusement that his bluster and 
strut have provided ever since he assumed the crown whose weight 
has caused his head to enlarge. He is constantly prone to bellow, 
"Boo!" and to look for the result with the air of saying "Aren't 
you frightened? "^'^ 

It is scarcely necessary to point out the fact that this 
attitude on the part of the press reflected and conformed to 

31 June 30, 1898. 

32 July 2, 1898. 
« July 17, 1898. 



64 CLARA EVE SCHTEBER 

the opinions of the American leaders in private and pubhc 
life. It helped to create that distrust of German diplomacy 
and world politics which had been engendered at Samoa and 
was further stimulated by Germany 's actions and utterances 
in China in the two or three years following. 

5. Germamj in the Caribbean and Latin America 

Germany's ambitions in Weltpolitik were not limited to 
the eastern hemisphere. She early attempted to get a 
foothold in the Caribbean. This was especially irritating 
to the United States because of our preponderant economic 
interests in this region and the fact that foreign intrusion in 
this district was a challenge to the most sacred section of 
our foreign poUcy — the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, the 
Germans after 1870 became rather imaptient over the 
Monroe Doctrine. Bismarck on various occasions re- 
ferred to it a "a species of arrogance peculiarly American 
and inexcusable," ''an insolent dogma" and "an interna- 
tional impertinence." And yet Bismarck was, among the 
German statesmen of his day, one of the least enthusiastic 
for German overseas expansion. The German press even 
exulted over German intrusion in the Caribbean as a final 
assault upon and triumph over the Monroe Doctrine. 

The following brief outline of German activities in Latin 
America will serve as the background against which to inter- 
pret the attitude of the United States. In November of 
1897 Germany attempted to intervene in Haiti and aroused 
an American protest. In 1901 Germany was observed 
making surveys of the Santa Margarita Islands off the 
coast of Venezuela. Admiral Dewey was despatched with 
a powerful fleet to watch developments here. In 1902 
minor difficulties arose in Guatemala relative to the collec- 
tion of debts due European states. The forcible and vigorous 
methods used shortly afterwards by Germany to coUect 
debts due her from Venezuela constituted the most sensa- 
tional phase of German activities in Latin America. Ger- 
many bombarded Venezuelan ports and warships to intimi- 
date Venezuela and force payment. President Roosevelt, 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 65 

by a threat of war, forced the kaiser to arbitrate. Germany 
showed particularly bad taste and judgment by again bom- 
barding forts during the progress of arbitration. In 1902 
Germany was able to put pressure on Denmark and block 
our negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West 
Indies. Finally, the development of a German sphere of 
interest in Brazil and the progress of German interests in 
Argentine and Chile alarmed many Americans. 

The American press doubted the good faith of the 
Germans in Latin America. The Outlook held that 

It is certainly difficult to apply any other name than war to 
the bombardment, day after day, of Fort San Carlos, by three 
German warships, with its active and continued defense, the 
destruction of a fishing village, and the enforcement of a blockade 
so closely maintained that it is reported that twelve fishermen on 
a little island were cut off from their supplies and starved to 

death The prestige of Germany, so the German 

Chancellor declared, required these things. . . But public 
opinion in America does not consider that prestige is greatly 
enhanced by acts of force towards a weak nation, acts, certainly 
not absolutely necessary, even if technically justified, and espe- 
cially to be regretted because they occurred precisely when the 
prospects of an amicable arbitration are most satisfactory.^* 

The ISJew York Sun expressed itself frankly upon the sub- 
ject of the Monroe Doctrine and its economic and stragetic 
foundations : 

As for our actual and prospective traffic with Latin America, 
experience should have taught us that from all parts of it which 
should fall into German, French or Italian hands our manu- 
facturers and merchants would be debarred. Then again, for 
strategic reasons too obvious to need emphasis, we, as owners of 
the Panama Canal, could not permit a European Power to occupy 
any part of the coasts of Central America, or of Colombia, Vene- 
zuela, and Ecuador The Monroe Doctrine was 

formulated not for a day but for all time. The American people 
will never renounce it. Never will they suffer the New World to 
be made the victim of partition. ^^ 

The Boston Herald inquired "What has the kaiser up his 
Venezuelan sleeve? Have we no pact to denounce the 

" Vol. 73, p. 229. 
« April 28, 1904. 

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, VOL. 12, NO. I, 1921 



66 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER 

G oth and the shameless Hun ? " ^6 To one not familiar with the 
situation it is surprising to discover with what vital interest 
the American press kept in touch with the whole situation 
from the sending of the Promemoria to the final adjust- 
ment of all claims at The Hague. PubUc sentiment was 
unanimous in condemning the "browbeating" of Venezuela 
by Germany and looked upon the methods of the Teutons 
as wholly unjust and ''unnecessarily severe." While ac- 
knowledging that creditors had a perfect right of insisting 
upon payment, the feeling of the United States was that the 
demands and the policy of action were not consistent with 
the dignity of a great nation. The Boston Herald was 
especially strong in soliciting pity for Venzuela in the face 
of German severity. Not one organ but called upon 
Germany to beware in extending her debt-collecting pro- 
pensities to the permanent occupation of Venzuelan terri- 
tory. Here we find expressed much the same feeling 
against German war aims and methods which existed dur- 
ing the recent war. Germany was called the ''shameless 
Hun " and there are many references to the manner in which 
helpless women and children and feeble old people were 
treated by the kaiser's troops. With but one single excep- 
tion all the newspapers agreed that the primary object of 
Germany was to test the real strength of our Monroe 
Doctrine. Even former Ambassador White, although he 
saw no real danger to the Monroe Doctrine, does state 
that the kaiser was apparently responsible for the sending 
of "German ships of war and the handling of sundry 
Venezuelans with decided roughness." There was cer- 
tainly sufficient evidence against Germany greatly to 
arouse American fears. Why did German sailors and 
German soldiers act as they did in Venezuela when the 
whole world knows that the entire German war machine 
was under the direct and personal control of the kaiser? 
If his subordinates disobeyed, why were they not punished, 
and if they were merely fulfiUing orders — -"for no German 
official acts without instructions" — why did the Berlin 

36 January 21, 1903. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 67 

foreign office continue to send to the Washington state 
department a series of notes whose purport was to assure 
the United States of the friendly spirit of Germany for us 
and of her respect for the fundamental principles of our 
foreign policy? Blowing forts to pieces and kilhng defence- 
less women and children are ways of expressing international 
amity generally unknown to America. 

A careful study of American sentiment as expressed in 
the various public utterances shows that the United States 
was constantly growing in her distrust of German ambitions. 
In spite of all the German official protestations of friendship 
for America a feeling of suspicion continued to grow. Ger- 
many had made too many blunders before in her deahngs 
with America to be trusted now in her activities in the 
Western hemisphere Her manner was too haughty, and 
bumptious, and autocratic. It did not harmonize with 
our ideals or with those of the Latin-American republics. 
So these states likewise questioned Germany's motives 
and turned to the United States for support and protec- 
tion. If the actions of Germany had been in accord with the 
status of the weak republics which she attacked there would 
have been no need of American interference. But the very 
austerity of Teutonic manners compelled the general public 
in the United States to think that what Germany really 
wanted was not the settlement of old debts but the perma- 
nent occupation of the territory attacked. This long 
series of German threats in the Caribbean and in South 
America did much to arouse in the people of the United 
States a definite fear of German miUtarism and German 
imperialism. Americans generally came to realize that 
German aggression was bound to lead to very serious 
consequences. 

6. General phases of German history 1870-1914 engendering 
suspicion on the part of the United States 

In addition to these specific instances of conflict between 
the United States and Germany there were certain larger 
phases of German development after 1870 which served to 



68 CLARA EVE SCHIEBEE 

make the United States fearful and suspicious of Germanic 
tendencies. First and foremost, probably, were the utter- 
ances and conduct of the kaiser, who afforded a striking 
symbol of German aggression, autocracy, mihtarism, and 
Weltpolitik. In particular, his statements dealing with 
divine-right, militarism and expansion incurred the derision 
or sarcastic criticism of the American press. There can 
be httle doubt that the kaiser was the heaviest liability 
which Germany carried in her foreign policy from 1888 to 
1918. The Prussianization of the empire by Bismarck, 
with the accompanying growth of autocracy and militarism, 
served to cool the ardor of Americans for the results of 
German unity. The treatment of German liberals and 
radicals from 1878 to 1890 and the oppression involved 
in the denationalization of Alsace-Lorraine operated to 
initiate that estimate of Germany as a curious political 
anachronism which was confirmed by the kaiser's gro- 
tesque allusions to the divine right of the Hohenzollern. Ger- 
man militarism appeared to be a special menace to the 
peace of the world. The miUtary flourish associated with 
all phases of German official policy, the ''armed peace" 
for which she stood, her opposition to disarmament at the 
Hague, the brutalities of army discipline, which were a pub- 
lic scandal even in Germany, the savagery of the custom of 
duelling, and the kaiser's absurd speeches concerning the 
primary loyalty of the German soldier to the kaiser which 
should go to the extent of shooting his own father and mother 
if so ordered for the amusement of the war-lord, all served to 
disgust the leaders of public opinion in the United States. 
Particularly was this the case between 1905 and 1914 when 
the United States was generally favorable to the pacifist 
and arbitration campaign. The Boston Transcript was 
almost alone in its praise of the moral training inculcated 
in the German army." The development of German 
Weltpolitik was a matter of concern to this country in 
cases other than those in which the United States came into 
direct conflict with it. The kaiser 's visits to the Near East 

" January 6, 1900. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 69 

in the interests of the Berhn-Bagdad project were the sub- 
ject of critical comment by the American papers, as well 
as the development of German control in Asia Minor and 
Mesopotamia. Especially was the United States soHcitous 
of insuring that clashes over world pohtics should not 
bring about a world war. Mr. Bishop has now shown that 
President Roosevelt practically forced the kaiser to accept 
the Algeciras Congress where the possibility of a war over 
jNIorocco was averted. The great increases in the German 
protective tariffs 'from 1879 to 1905 aroused the jealousy 
of American economic interests, particularly the embargo on 
American meats. Then, there were diplomatic disputes 
over such matters as citizenship, and irritation caused by 
limitations placed on certain types of American business in 
Germany. Finally, the chief hold of Teutonism on Amer- 
ican thought — the American college professors of Germanic 
training — was gradully being loosened through the distinct 
falling off of the number of Americans who went to Germany 
for their graduate work. 

To those who will make a careful study of the many and 
varied activities of Germany since 1871 and to those who 
will follow American reactions as found in the pubhc press 
and in the sober judgement of its statesmen and its citizens 
in all walks of life — there must certainly come the reaUza- 
tion that at the beginning of the World's War the majority 
of the .American sentiment was opposed to Germany. This 
was but the natural and inevitable result of our growing 
suspicion of Germany in the fields of trade and colonization, 
in her general world poUcy, in her cold defiance of solemn 
treaties, and in our increasing fear of the possibilities of 
German miUtarism. In a word— the entire pohcy of the 
German Government was completely out of harmony with 
American institutions, and the majority of the people of 
the United States were opposed to German autocracy, in 
all its forms and modes of expression. 



70 CLAJIA EVE SCHIEBER 

7. Attitude of leading citizens of the United States towards 
Germany in 1914- 

While it is safe to hold that newspapers either reflect or 
shape prevaiUng pubhc opinion, it is not wholly safe to rely 
upon their attitude alone, and in the preceding generaliza- 
tions concerning the changing American attitude towards 
Germany reliance was not put merely upon newspaper 
opinion. A careful study of the opinion of leading states- 
men and publicists was also executed. ^^ In order to make 
this aspect of the investigation even more complete a ques- 
tionnaire was sent out to leading representative Americans 
in all fields of life making inquiry as to their conception of 
the relative attitude of the United States towards Germany 
in 1914. As this was sent out just at the close of the world 
war when passions were still warm and an expression of 
regard for Germany was viewed as savoring of treason 
there is httle doubt but that the replies were less objective 
than they would have been if made in May of 1914. Yet, 
after allowing for all probability of bias due to circum- 
stances, there seems to be no doubt from a reading of the 
one hundred and seventy rephes received, that these repre- 
sentative citizens from all professions beheved that in 1914 
the United States was more suspicious of, and unfriendly 
towards, Germany than towards any other major European 
state. 

Judging from these replies the majority of prominent 
citizens from all parts of the country and representing all 
groups and interests were of the opinion that we were 
definitely suspicious and fearful of Germany in July, 1914, 
before the opening of the world war; that this feeling was 
not uniform throughout all elements of society but tended 
to be more favorable toward Germany in university groups; 
and that this feeling of fear and suspicion was largely due to 
the increasingly arrogant, saber-rattHng, swash-buckling 
attitude of German officials and the growing militaristic 
tendency of the German government. A majority of the 
statements in the replies to the questionnaire therefore agree 

2* This is given in detail in the dissertation. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 71 

with the quotations gathered from the press, and expressions 
of public opinion that have been cited in former sections 
to the effect that from a friendly attitude towards Germany 
during the Franco-Prussian war, 1870-71, the United States, 
through a long series of incidents, came gradually to have a 
feeling of fear, suspicion, and distrust of Germany and her 
motives. 

IV. German Attempts to Counteract the Growth 
OF Anti-German Sentiment in the United States 

There is no doubt that the German government and the 
German emperor were well aware of this striking cooling of 
the traditional friendship of the United States for Germany. 
There is no less doubt that both sincerely desired the good 
willof this country. But it seems never to have occurred 
to them that American friendship could have been retained 
most effectively by that sort of conduct in domestic policy 
and foreign relations which could command the respect of 
civilized mankind. Rather, they prefered to proceed with 
their policies at home and abroad and rely upon ostenta- 
tious display of imperial pleasure and beneficence and upon 
propaganda to offset the progress of anti-German feeling. 

In 1902 the United States was honored by a visit from no 
less a personage than Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother 
of the kaiser. He came officially to participate in the cere- 
monies attending the launching of a private yacht which had 
been built for the kaiser in America. The visit was the 
occasion of many notable receptions by public officials and 
prominent citizens, the bestowing of gifts from the kaiser, 
and a formal display of strong German- American sentiment. 
The papers were in most cases cordial and respectful, though 
some openly described the trip as propaganda.^^ Even 
those which were inchned to be pleasant to the prince re- 
minded him of the pending difficulties in the Caribbean and 
of the high German tariff.^" Some papers bitterly attacked 

39 The Chicago Tribune was the most enthusiastic in praise of the prince. 
The New York Herald perhaps the least cordial. 
" New York Evening Post, January 13, 1902. 



72 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 

the German autocracy and derided the whole notion that 
we were honored by the visit of a Hohenzollern Prince.*^ 
Congressman Wheeler of Kentucky bitterly assailed any 
notion of a cordial reception of the royal visitor/^ It is 
interesting to note that the papers most vigorously assailing 
the prince were often those of undisguised British sympa- 
thies. The New York Herald, upon Prince Henry's depar- 
ture from this country, published the following ironical 
hon voyage. 

Prince of Prussia; Grand Duke of Hock der kaiser; Baron 
Bingenon derrhine; Marquis of Johannesberg and Kirschwasser; 
Margrave of Katzenjammer; Lord Rathskeller von Pabst; Earl of 
Pretzel; hereditary ruler of Donner and Blitzen; Archduke 
Laubenheimer; Field Marshal Wasislosmith ; brother to the 
Emperor of Germany ; nephew to the King of England ; Uncle to 
the heir apparent to the throne of Prussia; cousin to the Prince 
of Wales; grand-son and grand-son-in-law of the late Queen of 
England. Born 1862. Made in Germany. General manager 
of the mailed fist in China, 1897. Head of the Imperial Bureau 
of International Amenities, Berlin, 1901. Discovered America, 

February 23, 1902 Descended upon Washington 

and received surrender of keys from Native Chiefs, February 27. 

Returned to New York Launched new German 

navy. Shooter's Island, February 28th. Proceeded to Chicago 
and quelled insurrection of malcontents in the German colony 
there located. Fell back on Waldorf-Astoria for supplies. Made 

second attack on Washington Penetrated wilds of 

Massachusetts. Sustained heavy assault of New England culi- 
nary forces, armed to the teeth with baked beans, brown bread and 
pumpkin pie. Wounded in the vicinity of the vermiform, returned 
to New York and evacuated the country in March. Returned 
to Berlin, having lost sixty-eight pounds in weight, but the 
gainer by a permanent case of dyspepsia and much useful knowl- 
edge of the new empire across the sea. Has advised Emperor 
to send his next fist across the sea by mail and not by special 
messenger. Was a welcome guest and deserved all his victories.** 

For a number of years the kaiser had been endeavoring 
to convince this country of his special friendliness through 
a presentation of a statue of Frederick the Great. For a 
time our officials were able to evade the reception of so un- 

" Harper's Weekhj, Vol. 47, p. 228. 

*- Congressional Record, vol. 25, pt. 2, pp. 1757-8. 

« March 9, 1902. 



AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 73 

American a symbol, but in 1905 it was no longer possible 
to delay, and President Roosevelt accepted it as graciously 
as he could and had the statue placed before the War 
College in Washington. The unveiling was made a very 
formal and serious occasion. The American press was 
generally critical of the propriety of accepting this gift. 
The Washington Evening Star suggested that we reciprocate 
by sending the kaiser a statue of James Monroe. ^^ 

As the number of American students in German univer- 
sities was steadily falling off, due to the improvement of 
our own institutions of higher learning, the kaiser hit upon 
an expedient for maintaining at least some portion of the 
German ascendency in our university circles. For years 
Hugo Munsterberg had been making vigorous efforts to 
prevent the progress of German- American coolness. The 
kaiser decided to found a number of exchange professor- 
ships by arrangement with leading American universities. 
No thinking person can doubt the educational advantages 
of such procedure, but it also served to increase German 
influence in this country and especially to paralyze with 
Hohenzollern splendor the American professors who lec- 
tured in Germany. Further, the kaiser aided in the estab- 
lishment of a Deutsches Haus at Columbia University and 
made many valuable gifts to the Harvard Germanic Mu- 
seum. No small number of American university presidents 
and professors were also able to include in their academic 
biographies the "Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia." 

Finally, societies were formed for perpetuating the 
German nationality among German emigrants who went 
to other lands, and for carrying on German propaganda in 
foreign lands. Among these were the Alldeutscher Verhand, 
the Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland, the Gustav 
Adolf Verein, the Diaspora Verein, and the Deutscher 
Wehr verein. These societies did their best to keep aUve 
German sentiments among Germans dispersed in many 
diverse regions of the earth. "^ The propaganda carried 

" May 24, 1902. 

" E. E. Sperry, Tentacles of the German Octopus in America. 



74 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER 

on by Dernberg and others from 1914-1917 in the United 
States in the hope of arousing sympathy for Germany is 
remembered by all. 

V. The Future 

The foregoing facts make it certain that the international 
feeling of one period is no safe or certain criterion of what 
the relations between the same states will become in another 
generation. The violent hatred of Germany, developed 
between 1870 and 1918, may, if circumstances are altered, 
be transformed into warm sympathy within ten years. 
The progress of liberalism in Germany may turn our sus- 
picions into confidence and respect, while autocratic and 
imperialistic policies on the part of our recent aUies may lead 
to a breach with them. Certainly our feelings towards 
France and Germany since 1870 have been completely re- 
versed in both cases. Already it is apparent that the 
French diplomacy since 1918 has begun to turn liberal 
American sentiment against her. The one redeeming fea- 
ture seems to be that, unless prevented by conflicting 
economic interests, our feelings are likely to be most cordial 
to that country which conducts itself most in harmony 
with the dictates of international decency and fair-dealing. 



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